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Highlights 
• Cueing an unresolved goal causes uninstructed intrusive rumination 
• Trait rumination increases vulnerability to reactive rumination on unresolved goals 
• Goal discrepancies as opposed to other forms of goal processing trigger rumination 






Background and Objectives 
Control theory predicts that the detection of goal discrepancies initiates ruminative self-focus 
(Martin & Tesser, 1996). Despite the breadth of applications and interest in control theory, 
there is a lack of experimental evidence evaluating this prediction. The present study 
provided the first experimental test of this prediction. 
Methods 
We examined uninstructed state rumination in response to the cueing of resolved and 
unresolved goals in a non-clinical population using a novel measure of online rumination.  
Results 
Consistent with control theory, cueing an unresolved goal resulted in significantly greater 
recurrent intrusive ruminative thoughts than cueing a resolved goal. Individual differences in 
trait rumination moderated the impact of the goal cueing task on the extent of state 
rumination: individuals who had a stronger tendency to habitually ruminate were more 
susceptible to the effects of cueing goal discrepancies.  
Limitations 
The findings await replication in a clinically depressed sample where there is greater 
variability and higher levels of trait rumination. 
Conclusions 
These results indicate that control theories of goal pursuit provide a valuable framework for 
understanding the circumstances that trigger state rumination. Additionally, our measure of 
uninstructed online state rumination was found to be a valid and sensitive index of the extent 
and temporal course of state rumination, indicating its value for further investigating the 
proximal causes of state rumination. 





Rumination is a specific form of repetitive self-focus that is known to maintain and 
exacerbate depressive symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000; Morrow & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1990; Spasojevic & Alloy, 2001; Watkins, 2008) and to increase vulnerability to 
developing depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991, 2000). It is thus important to investigate 
factors that cause individuals to pathologically ruminate, and the mechanisms by which 
rumination exacts detrimental effects.  
 Response Styles Theory (RST; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) conceptualises rumination as 
a stable, trait-like style of responding to depressed mood involving persistent focus on 
negative emotions. RST emphasises the response style as opposed to cognitive content and 
primarily focuses on maladaptive consequences of rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991; 
Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Whereas RST considers aspects of 
personality and early experience that might contribute to habitual tendencies to ruminate, 
control theory considers proximal, contextual factors that are hypothesised to predict 
individual occurrences of ruminative thought (Watkins, 2008). Control theories adopt a 
broader conceptualisation of rumination as “a class of conscious thoughts that revolve around 
a common theme and occur in the absence of immediate environmental demands requiring 
the thoughts” (Martin & Tesser, 1996, p. 7). This conceptualisation includes adaptive and 
maladaptive components of rumination (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1982; Martin & Tesser, 
1996; Watkins, 2008) and provides greater specification of the mechanisms thought to trigger 
state rumination.  
 Control theories emphasise the role of focusing on an ideal-actual self-discrepancy in 
ruminative responses. Unexpected progress (more or less) towards pursuing a goal is 
hypothesised to instigate rumination, which continues until the discrepancy is resolved, either 
by restoring goal progress or disengaging from the goal. Negative rumination (caused by lack 
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of goal progress) is argued to have a longer time course than positive rumination (caused by 
unexpected goal progress) because a continuation of the status quo will maintain negative 
rumination. State rumination is thus argued to predominantly occur in response to the 
detection of a negative ideal-actual self-discrepancy regarding personally important goals. 
Control theory predicts that concrete goal-focused rumination functions as a form as problem 
solving, whereas abstract goal-focused rumination is proposed to interfere with problem-
solving (Watkins, 2008). Control theory thus has a much broader conceptualisation of 
rumination incorporating both adaptive and maladaptive repetitive thoughts about goal 
discrepancies. 
The theories are not inconsistent: depressed individuals are likely to hold the goal of 
escaping from their persistent negative mood, which both theories predict would result in 
rumination about their depression (McIntosh, 1996). However, control theory accounts 
incorporate a broader specification of the content of rumination (for an elaborated 
consideration of areas of overlap and distinction see Watkins, 2008).  
  Control theories have been applied to numerous areas of psychology including 
motivation, psychopathology, and self-regulation (e.g., Burnette, O’Boyle, Van Epps, 
Pollack, & Finkel, 2012; Watkins, 2011). However, few studies have empirically evaluated 
whether goal-discrepancies are associated with rumination, and to our knowledge the 
prediction that unresolved goals causally instigate state rumination has yet to be tested. In a 
diary study in students, Lavallee and Campbell (1995) found that greater rumination and 
negative affect were reported after negative events related to self-reported personal goals than 
after goal-irrelevant negative events. However, because progress on the goals was not directly 




 Moberly and Watkins (2010) used experience sampling methodology, in which 
negative affect, rumination, and goal appraisals were reported at eight random intervals daily 
over a week to examine state rumination and goal progress. Consistent with control theory, 
low goal success was correlated with greater ruminative self-focus and negative affect. 
Moreover both ruminative self-focus and negative affect were highest when participants’ 
most salient goal was important and progress towards that goal was low. However, this study 
does not test the causal hypothesis that frustrated goal progress instigates state rumination, 
which is an important next step to empirically validate a central prediction of control theories 
of rumination. 
 The present study thus sought to test this important causal hypothesis. Participants 
identified and focused on an on-going, unresolved, and personally relevant goal and we then 
measured subsequent spontaneous rumination about that goal over a 50 minute period. In 
order to directly contrast the impact of thinking about unresolved goals with another form of 
goal focus, a matched control condition in which the goal was resolved was included. Thus, 
the experiment examined whether cueing a personally relevant unresolved goal elicited 
uninstructed state rumination.   
To date, empirical investigations of rumination have focused on understanding the 
consequences of rumination within a RST framework (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Watkins, 
2008). Therefore, an important next step in this field is a systematic empirical investigation of 
the mechanisms hypothesized to drive state rumination, such as unresolved goals. To date, 
methodologies have focused on the use of deliberate instructions to ruminate (e.g., Nolen-
Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993) to examine the consequences of state rumination. Whilst 
valuable, this approach leaves the causes of spontaneous uninstructed rumination 
unexamined. In addition, it lacks ecological validity, because the content and nature of the 
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resultant rumination may not correspond to the naturally occurring and often involuntary 
experiences of rumination in daily life.  
 A further consequence of this focus is that there has been little development of 
immediate and dynamic measures of uninstructed state rumination. Because ruminative 
thinking fluctuates over time, it is critical to examine the occurrence of state rumination as it 
happens. The development and validation of a laboratory measure of state rumination that is 
sensitive to dynamic change over time is therefore an essential methodological step to 
directly test hypotheses regarding putative causes of rumination.  
We sought to validate a dynamic and immediate measure of state rumination that was 
sensitive to spontaneous ruminative thoughts over time, by adapting a measure of mind-
wandering. The sustained attention to response task (SART; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, 
Baddeley, & Yiend, 1997) uses a simple go/no-go paradigm that is designed to place minimal 
demands on controlled processes, and, thereby, provides a valid means of assessing 
attentional lapses. The SART elicits a repetitive automatic style of responding to the stimuli, 
thereby increasing the likelihood of mind-wandering. In order to obtain an index of mind-
wandering that is not reliant on participant’s meta-awareness (Christoff, Gordon, Smallwood, 
Smith, & Schooler, 2009), the SART has been adapted to pseudo-randomly present thought 
probes asking participants to indicate where their attention was just focused. Task-unrelated 
thought during the SART is associated with increased errors of commission (incorrectly 
responding on no-go trials) (Smallwood et al., 2004). The task thus provides both behavioural 
and self-report measures of state changes in mind-wandering. 
 In order to specifically examine state rumination, we modified the thought probes to 
ask about ruminative thinking about a personal goal. Mood probes were included in order to 
examine the temporal relationship between rumination and negative affect.  
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  We also examined whether the trait tendency towards pathological rumination 
increases individual sensitivity to state rumination following cueing an unresolved goal. 
Individual differences in trait rumination were expected to be associated with state 
rumination, as assessed using the SART. Such a positive relationship would provide 
convergent validation of the rumination measure. Few studies have investigated how RST 
and control theory interact by examining the relationship between trait rumination and 
reactive state rumination about frustrated goal progress. The most parsimonious integration of 
these theories predicts that individuals at increased susceptibility to depressive rumination 
will experience more intrusive rumination following cueing an unresolved goal. Individual 
differences in trait rumination are predictive of state rumination as assessed using experience 
sampling (Moberly & Watkins, 2008) and diary study (Puterman, De Longis & Pomaki, 
2010) methodologies, but the interaction between trait rumination and state rumination in 
response to unresolved goals  has yet to be directly examined.  
 In sum, consistent with control theory, we predicted that cueing an unresolved 
personal goal would cause greater intrusive ruminative thoughts during the modified SART 
than cueing a resolved goal.  We further predicted that trait rumination would moderate the 
impact of the goal manipulation on subsequent state rumination as assessed by the thought 
probes. A prominent theory of rumination and cognitive control proposes that on-going 
rumination acts as a cognitive load (e.g., Watkins & Brown, 2002). Therefore if unresolved 
goals elicited greater state rumination then they might also be predicted to deplete working 
memory resources available for the performance of concurrent cognitive tasks such as the 
SART. We therefore additionally examined the prediction that individuals in the unresolved 
goal condition would demonstrate impaired behavioural performance (more errors of 
commission and/or slowed response times (RTs) to non-targets) relative to individuals in the 
resolved goal condition. Given the lack of both previous experimental work examining the 
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predictions of control theory of rumination and of theoretical elaboration regarding proximal 
(as opposed to trait individual difference level) causes of abstract versus concrete rumination, 
there was insufficient evidence from which to derive a priori predictions regarding process 
aspects of rumination (abstract versus concrete), and this issue was beyond the scope of the 
present experiment. Rumination about depressive symptoms is known to exacerbate sadness 
amongst dysphoric and depressed individuals (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993) but 
no previous experimental work has examined the affective consequences of a control theory 
operationalisation of rumination. We therefore additionally examined whether unresolved 
goals resulted in greater sadness than resolved goals. In contrast to previous studies inducing 
rumination, this novel goal manipulation was not focused on depressive feelings and 
symptoms, we therefore made no specific prediction regarding the association between 
focusing on unresolved goals and concurrent negative affect. 
2. Method 
2. 1 Participants 
39 participants were recruited from the University of Exeter student population, and 
received course credit or £10 for participating. Participants were required to have normal or 
corrected to normal vision. 
2.2 Measures and Materials 
2.2.1 Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) 
The BDI-II is a 21-item questionnaire which assesses the presence and severity of 
depressive symptoms over the preceding two weeks. Responses range from 0 (e.g., “I do not 
feel like a failure”) to 3 (e.g., “I feel I am a total failure as a person”). Item scores are 
summed to generate an overall score; higher scores represent more severe depressive 
symptoms (range 0-63).The BDI-II has good psychometric properties (Strauss, Sherman & 
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Spreen, 2006), high internal consistency (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998) and good test-
retest reliability (Sprinkle et al., 2002).  
2.2.2 Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
The RRS of the Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ, Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991) is a 22-item measure of depressive rumination. Items include “analyze recent events 
and try to understand why you are depressed” and “think about how alone you feel”. 
Responses range from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost always) for what participants “generally 
do” when they are feeling sad or depressed. Item scores are summed to generate an overall 
score (range 22-88); higher scores represent a greater trait tendency to depressive rumination. 
The RRS has high internal consistency, acceptable construct validity, and good test-retest 
reliability (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Treynor et al., 2003)  
2.2.3 Visual Analogue Scales  
Visual analogue scales were used to assess current levels of sadness, tension, and self-
focus, and therefore index changes in emotional response (e.g., distress) in response to 
focusing on resolved and unresolved personal goals. Participants indicated on 3 bipolar scales 
ranging from 0 (very happy; very calm; not at all focused on myself) to 9 (very sad; very 
tense; extremely focused on myself) how they were feeling “at the present moment”. Scales 
of this format have been found to be reliable and sensitive measures of current mood and self-
focus (e.g., Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; 2004).  
2.2.4 Goal cueing task 
The goal cueing task was adapted from Behar, Zuellig and Borkovec’s (2005) worry 
induction. The experimental condition, which was predicted to elicit rumination, instructed 
participants to identify an ongoing and unresolved concern that had repeatedly come into 
their mind and caused them to feel negative or stressed during the previous week. Examples 
of appropriate problems were provided, and participants briefly outlined the problem that 
10 
 
they had identified prior to the goal focus period. Participants then rated the extent to which 
their unresolved goal had been bothering them (a) at its worst, and (b) in the past week, and 
the proportion of their time that they had spent thinking about it during that week. The 10 
minute goal focus period followed, during which participants worked through a pre-recorded 
script delivered over headphones, which guided them through focusing on the concern 
identified. Items in the script included “think about what is important about this difficulty in 
terms of your personal goals” and “focus on how this problem reflects a lack of progress on 
important personal goals”. The control condition asked participants to spend the same period 
of time thinking about a concern that had previously troubled them, but that had since been 
resolved. Items from the control script included “think about what was important about this 
difficulty in terms of your personal goals” and “focus on how resolving this problem reflects 
progress on important personal goals”. Thus, the two versions of the task directly contrasted 
the impact of self-focus on resolved and unresolved goals. Moreover, because the two goal 
types were not expected to differ in subjective evaluations of their nature or severity when 
progress was frustrated, the task was intended to specifically examine goal discrepancies, as 
opposed to goal importance. 
2.2.5 Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley & 
Yiend, 1997) 
The modified SART presented participants with 1800 neutral words. Each word was 
presented individually for 300ms followed by a 900ms mask. The majority of trials required 
participants to respond to the word with a button press (go trials). On a minority of trials (no-
go trials), when the word was presented in uppercase, participants were required to withhold 
their response. The task comprised four blocks, each presenting 450 trials consisting of 45 
words repeated ten times in a different order. Within each set of 45 words, 5 uppercase words 
appeared randomly among 40 lowercase words. There was no discernible break between 
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blocks. Participants were pseudo-randomly (following 60% of no-go trials within each block) 
probed regarding the focus of their attention immediately prior to the probe. The probes 
asked participants to select from six response options, which were explained before the task, 
to describe what they were thinking about just before the probe. These options were: (a) task 
(i.e., the stimuli or appropriate response); (b) task performance; (c) current physical state (i.e., 
conditions such as hunger or sleepiness); (d) the concern identified and thought about in the 
previous task (i.e., the unresolved/resolved goal, and our index of state rumination); (e) other 
personal worries that were not connected to the problem identified in the previous task; (f) 
other thought types. Participants pressed a key corresponding to the option that best described 
the focus of their attention. Participants additionally rated their mood and degree of self-focus 
following each probe using bipolar computerized scales where they pressed the key (1-9) that 
best described their degree of sadness, tension and self-focus respectively. The task took 50 
minutes to complete.  
2.3 Design and procedure 
The current study had a between subjects design with one main independent variable: 
goal condition (resolved vs. unresolved goal). Critical dependent variables were state 
rumination reported during thought probes and mood during the modified SART. 
Additionally, error rate and reaction time data from the modified SART were examined. 
Participants attended two sessions. In the first session participants completed the BDI-II and 
RRS1. In a second session they completed the goal manipulation followed by the modified 
                                                          
1 A measure of retrospective subjective state in performance settings (Dundee Stress State 
Questionnaire; Matthews, Campbell, & Falconer, 2000) and a measure of habitual negative 
thinking (Habit Index of Negative Thinking; Verplanken, Friborg, Wang, Trafimow & 
Woolf, 2007)  and a measure of working memory capacity (the Automated Operation Span 
Task (AOSPAN; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005) were also administered. 
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SART. Participants were randomly allocated to the unresolved or resolved goal condition. 
Before and after completing the goal manipulation, participants rated their current level of 
sadness, tension, and self-focus using the visual analogue scales. 
3. Results 
3.1 Participant characteristics 
77.5% of the sample was female; 19 participants completed the unresolved goal task 
and 20 completed the resolved goal task. The mean age was 22.95 (S.D. = 7.10). The mean 
depressive symptoms on the BDI-II was 10.13 (SD = 6.60) and the mean level of trait 
rumination on the RRS was 45.41 (SD = 11.48). The two conditions (resolved vs. unresolved 
goal) did not reliably differ in symptoms of depression (p> 0.3) or trait rumination (p>0.9). 
Participants in the unresolved goal condition reported having more thoughts of the 
goal cued in the past week, t (37) = 14.94, p <0.001, ƞ² = 0.858 (M = 7.11, SD = 0.76) than 
participants in the resolved goal condition (M = 2.200, SD = 1.240), and being more bothered 
by the goal, t (37) = 12.07, p <0.001,  ƞ² = 0.797 (M = 7.05, SD = 0.97) than participants in 
the resolved goal condition (M = 2.10, SD = 1.52). There was no effect of condition on 
participants’ evaluation of how much the goal had bothered them at its worst (p>0.2), the 
importance of the goal (p>0.5), the duration of the goal (p>0.3), or how much the goal related 
to general goals and concerns (p>0.1). Thus, the goals identified in the two conditions did not 
differ in subjective evaluations of their nature or severity, but participants in the unresolved 
goal condition reported that the goal was one that was bothering them more than participants 
in the resolved goal condition. 
3.2 Effects of goal manipulation on mood and self-focus 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
However, there were not significant relationships with regard to these measures and so data 
regarding these is not reported here. 
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2 (time: pre-goal manipulation, post-goal manipulation) x 2 (condition: unresolved, 
resolved) ANOVAs examined the impact of the goal manipulation on participants sadness, 
tension and self-focus. There was a significant main effect of time on sadness, F (1, 37) = 
55.94, p<0.001, ƞp² = 0.602 reflecting sadder mood following the manipulation. There was no 
main effect of condition, F (1, 37) = 0.33, p>0.5, ƞp² = 0.009. There was a trend towards a 
significant interaction, F (1, 37) = 3.11, p = 0.09, ƞp² = 0.077. However, simple effects 
analyses revealed no significant differences between groups either before the manipulation, F 
(1, 37) = 0.09, p = 0.762, ƞp²<0.01, or after the manipulation, F (1, 37) = 2.10, p = 0.156, ƞp² 
= 0.05. There was a significant effect of time in each condition (both ps< 0.001, ƞp²s>0.3), 
reflecting a worsening of sad mood following the manipulation. In the 2 x 2 ANOVA for 
tension, there was a significant main effect of time, F (1, 37) = 20.62, p<0.001, ƞp² = 0.358 
reflecting an increase in tension following the manipulation. There was no main effect of 
condition, F (1, 37) = 0.21, p>0.6, ƞp² = 0.006, and the interaction was not significant, F (1, 
37) = 1.22, p>0.2, ƞp² = 0.032. Thus, the goal manipulation did not differentially influence 
participants’ levels of sadness or tension, indicating that the two goal conditions did not differ 
significantly in their emotional response to the goal. In the 2 x 2 ANOVA for self-focus, there 
was a significant main effect of time, F (1, 37) = 7.73, p = 0.008, ƞp² = 0.173, reflecting an 
increase in self-focus following the goal manipulation (mean increase = 0.83). There was no 
main effect of condition, F (1, 37) = 2.39, p>0.1, ƞp² = 0.061, and the interaction was not 
significant, F (1, 37) = 0.1, p>0.7, ƞp² = 0.003. Thus, as intended, the tasks did not appear to 
differentially prompt participants to focus on themselves and their goals. 
 3.3 State rumination during the Modified SART 
There was an effect of goal condition on number of ruminative thoughts during the 
SART, t (20.04) = 2.7, p = 0.01, ƞ² = 0.171 (Welch’s t-test applied to correct for inequality of 
variances), reflecting more ruminative thoughts to thought probes in the unresolved goal 
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condition (M = 14.42, SD = 16.71) than in the resolved goal condition (M = 3.80, SD = 4.09). 
The conditions did not differ in the frequency of any other thought types (thoughts of the 
task, p > 0.2; task performance, p > 0.3; physical state, p > 0.5; other personal concerns, p > 
0.5; any other thoughts p> 0.2). On average, participants in the unresolved goal condition 
reported ruminative thoughts it on 17.5% of probes, relative to thoughts about the cued goal 
on 3.4% of probes in the resolved condition. Thus, as predicted, cueing an unresolved goal 
resulted in more repetitive thought about the goal during the subsequent task than cueing a 
resolved goal. 
 A 2 (condition: unresolved goal, resolved goal) x 4 (time: block 1, block 2, block 3, 
block 4) mixed ANOVA examined whether rumination about the identified concern was 
more persistent when this concern was unresolved  than when it was resolved. There was a 
significant main effect of condition, F (1, 37) = 7.61, p = 0.009, ƞp² = 0.171, and of time, F 
(2.45, 90.82) = 4.65, p = 0.008, ƞp² = 0.112, (Huynh Feldt correction applied), and the 
interaction was significant, F (2.45, 90.82) = 3.17, p = 0.037, ƞp² = 0.079 reflecting a 
quadratic trend interaction, F (1, 37) = 9.19, p = 0.004, ƞp² = 0.199, (Figure 1). Simple effects 
analyses revealed that the unresolved goal condition reported significantly more intrusive 
ruminative thoughts in block 2, F (1, 37) = 6.94, p = 0.012, ƞp² = 0.16, block 3, F (1, 37) = 
11.62, p = 0.002, ƞp² = 0.24, and block 4, F (1, 37) = 5.89, p = 0.020, ƞp² = 0.14. The groups 
did not reliably differ in number of intrusive ruminations during block 1, F (1, 37) = 1.26, p = 
0.270, ƞp² = 0.03. 
<INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
3.4 Trait rumination and state rumination during the Modified SART 
 Hierarchical regression was used to examine whether trait rumination moderated the 
effect of the goal manipulation on rumination during the modified SART. Goal condition (1: 
unresolved goal, 0: resolved goal) and centred RRS scores (RRSc) were entered in block one 
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of the regression, and the interaction term (goal condition x RRSc) in block 2 (Table 1). The 
interaction term explained a significant increase in variance of state rumination, ΔR² = 0.092, 
F (1, 35) = 4.71, p = 0.037. Thus, trait rumination was a significant moderator of the effect of 
the goal manipulation on ruminative thoughts during the modified SART.  
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
As illustrated in Figure 2, the unstandardized simple slope for participants 1 SD below 
the mean for trait rumination was 2.76, this was not significantly different from 0, t (35) = 
0.54, p >0.5, ƞ²<0.01. The unstandardized simple slope for participants 1 SD above the mean 
for trait rumination was 18.595, this was significantly greater than 0, t (35) = 3.63, p = 0.001, 
ƞ² = 0.274. Thus, as predicted, the effect of the goal manipulation on subsequent rumination 
was greater for participants reporting high levels of trait rumination on the RRS. 
<INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
3.5 Brooding and reflection and state rumination 
Hierarchical regression was used to examine whether trait brooding moderated the effect of 
the goal manipulation on rumination during the modified SART. Goal condition (1: 
unresolved goal, 0: resolved goal) and centred RRSbrooding scores (RRSbroodingc) were 
entered in block one of the regression, and the interaction term (goal condition x 
RRSbroodingc) in block 2. The interaction term explained a significant increase in variance 
of state rumination, ΔR² = 0.189, F (1, 35) = 12.017, p = 0.001. Thus, trait brooding was a 
significant moderator of the effect of the goal manipulation on ruminative thoughts during the 
modified SART task. The unstandardized simple slope for participants 1 SD below the mean 
for trait brooding was -1.352, this was not significantly different from 0, t (35) = -0.289, p = 
0.775, ƞ²<0.01. The unstandardized simple slope for participants 1 SD above the mean for 
trait brooding was 22.004, this was significantly greater than 0, t (35) = 4.73, p < 0.001, ƞ² = 
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0.390. Thus, as predicted, the effect of the goal manipulation on subsequent rumination was 
greater for participants reporting high levels of trait brooding on the RRS. 
When these analyses were repeated for trait reflection, the interaction term did not explain a 
significant increase in variance of state rumination, ΔR² = 0.001, F (1, 35) = 0.029, p = 0.866. 
Thus, trait reflection was not a significant moderator of the effect of the goal manipulation on 
ruminative thoughts during the modified SART task. 
3.6 Errors of commission and correct go-trial RTs during the modified SART 
 Table 2 illustrates the percentage error rates and mean RTs for each condition during 
each block of the modified SART.  
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
2 (condition) x 4 (time) mixed ANOVAs examined whether the goal conditions 
differentially increased errors rates or slowed RTs on the modified SART. There was a 
significant main effect of condition on errors of commission, F (1, 37) = 9.14, p = 0.005, ƞp² 
= 0.198, reflecting more errors in the resolved goal condition (M = 88.90, SD = 51.83) than 
in the unresolved goal condition (M = 46.84, SD = 32.28), and a significant main effect of 
time, F (1, 37) = 12.58, p<0.001, ƞp² = 0.254, reflecting an increase in error rates as the task 
progressed. The interaction was not significant (p>0.1).  
 There was a significant main effect of condition on correct go-trial RTs, F (1, 37) = 
4.34, p = 0.044, ƞp² = 0.105, reflecting significantly longer RTs in the unresolved goal 
condition (M = 505.82, SD = 86.02) than in the resolved goal condition (M = 446.05, SD = 
89.70), and a significant main effect of time, F (3, 37) = 6.90, p = 0.03, ƞp² = 0.157, reflecting 
a speeding of responses as the task progressed. The interaction was not significant (p>0.5). 
There were no significant correlations between frequency of ruminative thoughts during the 
SART and errors of commission, r (39) = -0.171, p =0.298, or RTs to correct go-trials, r (39) 
=0.132, p = 0.425, and this was also the case for trait rumination (rs< 0.3, ps>0.14). 
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Thus, participants in the two goal conditions appear to have adopted different 
thresholds for their speed-accuracy trade-off, such that participants who focused on an 
unresolved goal were slower and more accurate on the modified SART. Consistent with a 
cognitive load account, the unresolved goal condition was slower to make a correct response. 
However, inconsistent with a cognitive load account, the unresolved goal condition made 
fewer errors of commission. Thus, as a consequence of this differential speed-accuracy trade-
off, it is not clear whether ruminating on an unresolved goal impairs or enhances performance 
on the SART.  
3.7 Mood and self-focus during the modified SART  
 There was no effect of goal condition on sadness, t (27.44) = 0.79, p = 0.43, ƞ² = 
0.071 (Welch’s t-test applied), tension, t (37) = 0.08, p = 0.935, ƞ² <0.001, or self-focus, t 
(37) = 0.94, p = 0.353, ƞ² = 0.023, to the probes in the SART. Thus, there was no evidence 
that the goal conditions (resolved versus unresolved goals) differentially caused negative 
affect during the SART. This was also the case when analyses were restricted to responses to 
the mood probes immediately following the probes in which participants had reported goal-
focused thoughts, t (31) = 0.215, p = 0.831, ƞ²<0.01. 
 
4. Discussion 
 The present study tested a key prediction of control theory of rumination: that 
activating unresolved goals would cause more rumination than activating resolved goals. 
Consistent with this hypothesis, cueing an unresolved goal resulted in more reported thoughts 
about that goal when probed during a subsequent SART than cueing a resolved goal.  
Uninstructed rumination about failures in goal progress was powerful and recurrent when 
cued in a relatively unconstrained context.  Moreover, the modified SART provided a 
valuable means to examine the occurrence and temporal course of state rumination.  
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 Our study examined whether control theories provide a useful conceptual framework 
for rumination. To our knowledge, this is the first study to directly examine whether cueing 
an unresolved goal causally triggers state rumination. Previous research has examined the 
relationship between goal discrepancies and trait tendencies to ruminate (e.g., McIntosh & 
Martin, 1992), and between goal-relevant negative events and self-reported self-focus 
(Lavallee & Campbell, 1995), and shown a correlation between impaired goal pursuit and 
ruminative self-focus (Moberly & Watkins, 2010). The present study provides direct 
evidence that when such a discrepancy is cued in an unconstrained context (i.e., the external 
environment is conducive to mind-wandering) it causes ruminative thoughts about the 
concern, which re-occur for a considerable period of time. Thus, the findings of this study are 
consistent with a central prediction of control theory of rumination. Our findings indicate that 
this goal-cueing procedure holds potential as an effective means of establishing the goals that 
operate as ruminative triggers for individuals, which is of value to examine both the causes 
and consequences of personally-relevant rumination. 
 The impact of the goal manipulation on subsequent state rumination was moderated 
by the trait tendency to ruminate, and also by trait brooding but not by trait reflection. Thus, 
those individuals who have a stronger tendency to habitually ruminate in a maladaptive 
manner were more susceptible to the effects of the cueing of an unresolved goal. This 
interaction of trait rumination and goal discrepancies in predicting state rumination suggests a 
potential integration between RST and control theory accounts of rumination. According to 
RST rumination occurs primarily in response to sadness, whereas control theories posit that it 
is cued by goal discrepancies. Our findings suggest rumination may be sensitive not only to 
fluctuations in negative moods, but also goal progress. Thus high trait ruminators may be 
more susceptible to reactive state rumination on failures in goal pursuit, which may have self-
regulatory consequences. This is the first empirical study to directly link the trait tendency to 
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ruminate with the occurrence of ruminative thoughts triggered by an unresolved personal 
goal. Consistent with the proposal that trait ruminators experience difficulty disengaging 
from ruminative content (e.g., Joormann, 2005), the impact of the goal manipulation was 
persisted for a considerable period of time. The interaction of trait rumination and goal 
discrepancies thus holds potential value in predicting the temporal course of state rumination. 
An important next step will be further delineating how the interaction of unresolved goals and 
trait rumination influences the duration of state rumination, potentially contributing to a 
comprehensive account integrating RST and control theory.  
The study additionally constituted a preliminary validation of a modified version of 
the SART as an index of state rumination. The modified SART was sensitive to the effects of 
a goal manipulation, and able to index ruminative thoughts about the goal over an extended 
period of time. The interaction of both trait rumination and trait brooding with the goal 
manipulation in predicting state rumination during the modified SART provides convergent 
evidence that the task constitutes a valid measure of ruminative thought. This task is thus of 
potential value to examine proximal causes of the onset and maintenance of state rumination.  
 Individuals who focused on unresolved goals were slower and more accurate on the 
modified SART than individuals in the resolved goal condition, which indicates differential 
speed-accuracy trade-off thresholds for the two goal conditions. As a consequence, it is not 
possible to draw conclusions regarding the prediction that state rumination acts as a cognitive 
load causing impaired performance on cognitive tasks. We offer no simple explanation for 
these differential findings for modified SART performance. One speculation is that intrusive 
ruminative thoughts are more salient than less emotive forms of task-unrelated thought, and 
thus increase awareness of attentional lapses (due to ruminating), resulting in a compensatory 
strategy of slowing responding in order to reduce the risk of errors. A useful next step in 
clarifying the impact of state rumination on attentional lapses during the SART would be to 
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adopt a more constrained version of the task, which cues responses (e.g., Manly et al., 2004), 
thereby restricting the likelihood of differential speed-accuracy trade-offs, and facilitating a 
direct examination of the causal influence of rumination upon SART performance. 
 Experimental condition (resolved versus unresolved goal) did not differentially 
increase concurrent negative affect. Little research has examined the temporal relationship 
between goal-focused (as opposed to feelings-focused) state rumination and negative affect. 
Whilst there has been theoretical elaboration of the relationship between control theory 
operationalizations of state rumination and negative affect (e.g., Martin & Tesser, 1996; 
Carver & Scheier, 1998), to our knowledge, there are no experimental studies that have 
directly measured state rumination about unresolved goals and concurrent negative affect. On 
the basis of existing data, it is not possible to draw firm conclusions regarding the nature and 
temporal course of the relationship between goal-focused state rumination and negative 
affect. This relationship merits more detailed and systematic examination.  
 Although we believe that this study constitutes an important advance in the empirical 
evaluation of theoretical models of rumination, there are a number of limitations. First, our 
sample consisted primarily of students, so it is unclear to what extent the findings would 
generalize to a broader population. Second, because this version of the SART permitted 
considerable variation in speed- accuracy trade-offs, we were unable to directly index failures 
of sustained attention behaviourally. Third, we limited our examination of the interaction of 
goal-discrepancies and trait rumination to an unselected sample, therefore the range of trait 
levels of rumination was largely at the lower end of the spectrum. It will be important to 
replicate this finding in a clinical sample where there is greater variability and higher levels 
of trait rumination, enabling a more direct examination of the inter-relations between 
pathological rumination, goal-discrepancies, negative affect and state rumination. Fourth, 
whilst the relationship between our measure of state rumination and trait brooding is 
21 
 
suggestive of maladaptive rumination, future work that directly addresses process aspects of 
state rumination such as level of goal construal and emotional tone of goal-focused 
cognitions (e.g., Watkins, 2008) will be important. 
4.1 Conclusion 
In sum, we demonstrated that cueing a discrepancy between one’s current and desired 
states on a personal goal causes state rumination. This supports a central prediction of Martin 
and Tesser’s (1996) control theory of rumination. Moreover, this effect persisted for a 
considerable time, which further supports the proposal that frustrated goal progress is a 
powerful trigger underpinning state rumination. Additionally, we found that the trait tendency 
to ruminate interacts with failures in goal progress to predict state rumination.  
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Figure 2: Simple slopes for state rumination one standard deviation above and below the 






















































Table 1: Hierarchical linear regression estimating state rumination during the modified 
SART task. 
Step 1: F (2, 36) = 5.220, p = 0.010, R² = 0.225 
Step 2: F (3, 35) = 5.408, p = 0.004, R² = 0.317 
* p<0.05, **p<0.01  
Table 2: % Errors of commission and mean RTs for correct go-trials during the modified 
SART task 
 Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 
Unresolved goal 
focus RTs 
535.57 (82.54) 508.57 (100.47) 495.32 (88.58) 483.71 (89.51) 
Resolved goal 
focus RTs 
461.90 (110.21) 453.87 (95.77) 447.76 (102.89) 425.52 (90.79) 
Unresolved goal 
errors 
18.21 (13.33)  24.00 (20.14) 26.63 (18.87) 24.84 (18.72) 
Resolved goal 
errors 
36.10 (27.72) 41.90 (28.15) 48.50 (26.75) 51.30 (25.29) 
 
 B S.E. ß 
Step 1    
Condition 10.670** 3.773 0.415 
RRSc 0.264 0.166 0.233 
Step 2    
Condition 10.676* 3.592 0.415 
RRSc -0.744 0.491 -0.048 
Condition x RRSc 0.690* 0.318 0.413 
